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INTRODUCTION 
This case is about the interpretation of a statute validly enacted by the Utah State 
Legislature. When the Utah Legislature passed the current version of Utah's Payment 
Bond Statute, it did not make any provision for rental charges. TSS' claim for rental 
charges is therefore outside the scope of that statute. As a result, if TSS wishes to pursue 
protection for its rental business, it must seek redress in the legislature, not in this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
I. The Payment Bond Statute Does Not Include Coverage For Rental 
Equipment. 
A. The Utah Legislature Has Previously Distinguished Between The Term 
"Furnished" And The Term "Rented." 
The crux of TSS' argument is that "liability for 'equipment. . . furnished' refers to 
all equipment provided for use on the project, which includes rental equipment." 
Appellee Br. at 6 (emphasis in original). However, in so arguing, TSS has failed to 
address Saratoga's numerous citations demonstrating that the Utah Legislature has 
1
 In its opposing memorandum, TSS contends that "Saratoga has failed to marshal the 
evidence to include all facts supporting the trial court's ruling," and that such a "failure 
to marshal the evidence . . . is grounds alone for affirming each of those rulings." 
Appellee Br. at 3, 3 n.l. However, TSS misapprehends the nature of the requirement to 
marshal evidence. The present case involved the trial court's ruling on cross-motions 
for summary judgment. As a result, there was no factual evidence for the court to weigh 
(indeed, the trial court was precluded from doing so). Therefore, there is no evidence to 
"marshal," and as a result, TSS' point is irrelevant. 
1 
consistently distinguished and ascribed different meanings to the terms "furnished" and 
"rented." Consider the following examples: 
^ When the Utah Legislature amended the Payment Bond Statute in 
1985, the legislature used both the terms "furnished" and "rented," 
stating "Any person who has furnished or rented any equipment or 
materials . . . has a direct right of action against the sureties upon 
such bond . . . ." 19S5 Utah L. ch. 219 § 1, Addendum C. 
^ When the Utah Legislature amended the Payment Bond Statute in 
1985, it made provisions for both "the reasonable value of the rented 
materials . . .furnished" as well as "the reasonable value of the 
materials furnished" Id. Thus, the legislature made a clear 
distinction between "rented materials" that were furnished and other 
"materials" that were furnished, making special reference to rentals. 
Id. 
r* Also in the 1985 amendment, the Legislature discussed both 
"material furnished" and "materials rented." Id. (Owner shall 
obtain a bond for "prompt payment for material furnished, 
equipment and materials rented, and labor performed under the 
contract.") (emphasis indicates amendment). 
r> Utah's Mechanics' Lien Statute was amended in 1981 to impose 
liability for equipment that was "furnished or rented" Utah Code 
Ann. §§38-1-3 (1988) (emphasis added). Specifically, the 
Mechanics' Lien Statute was amended in 1981 to state, in relevant 
part: 
Contractors, subcontractors and all persons performing any 
services or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment 
used in the construction, alteration, or improvement of any 
building or structure or improvement to any premises in any 
manner . . . shall have a lien upon the property upon or 
concerning which they have rendered service, performed 
labor or furnished or rented materials or equipment for the 
2 
value of the service rendered, labor performed or materials or 
equipment furnished or rented by each respectively . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1981) (emphasis added). 
^ Non-bond statutes in Utah have likewise distinguished between 
"furnish" and "rent." See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-603 
(making it unlawful "for any industry member, . . ., to furnish, give, 
rent, lend, or sell any equipment, fixtures, signs, supplies, money, 
services, or other thing of value . . . to the department, to any 
retailer, or to any third party retailer association or display company 
where the benefits resulting from the thing of value flow to the 
individual retailers [with exceptions]." 
^ Other states' bond statutes distinguish between "furnishing," 
"supplying," and "renting." See e.g., Alaska Stat. Ann. § 08.18.071 
(Each applicant shall. . . file with the commissioner a surety bond . . 
. conditioned upon the applicant's promise to pay all. . . (2) persons 
furnishing labor or material or renting or supplying equipment to the 
applicant. . . .") 
^ Other states' non-bond statutes likewise distinguish the terms "rent" 
and "furnish." See, e.g., Ala. Code Ann. § 40-21-52 (requiring 
"[ejach freight line or equipment company doing business, owning, 
operating, renting, leasing, or furnishing cars" to file forms showing 
number of miles run over railway lines (emphasis added)); Ariz. 
Rev. Stat. § 4-243 (making it unlawful for a person in the business of 
alcoholic beverages "[t]o furnish, give, rent, lend or sell to the 
retailer equipment, fixtures, signs, supplies " (emphasis 
added)). 
^ Federal law also has also drawn a distinction between "furnishing" 
and "renting." See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 1471 (providing Director of 
United States Information Agency with authority "to furnish, sell, or 
rent, by contract or otherwise, educational and information materials 
and equipment for dissemination to, or use by, peoples of foreign 
countries" (emphasis added)). 
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Given this history, it is clear that, as Saratoga previously pointed out, when the 
Utah Legislature intends to cover rentals, it expressly refers to the term "rental' in the 
applicable statute's language. In interpreting the Payment Bond Statute, the Court 
should not ignore the fact that the terms "furnished" and "rented" have been used to 
connote different meanings in similar statutes. 
B. The Legislative History Of The Payment Bond Statute Demonstrates 
That Coverage For Rental Equipment Is Excluded. 
As discussed in Saratoga's opening brief, in 1985 the Utah Legislature amended 
i 
the Payment Bond Statute to expressly include coverage for rental equipment. 1985 Utah 
L. ch. 219 § 1, Addendum C. Indeed, the main purpose of the 1985 amendment was to 
include rental equipment within the statute's scope. The legislative history clearly shows < 
that the Utah Legislature, in its 1985 amendment, focused on and considered protection 
for rental equipment and enacted an amendment specifically and directly designed to 
encompass rentals. Obviously, rental equipment was an issue contemplated and 
addressed in 1985. That coverage, however, was taken away by the 1987 amendment. 
1987 Utah L. ch. 218 §§ 3,4. With this history, it cannot be said that the 1987 deletion ( 
of all references to rentals was, as TSS argues, simply a "mistake," or that it "slipped the 
mind" of legislative drafters in the two amendments that have since been enacted. If the < 
1987 omission was simply an error, the legislature has had ample opportunities to correct 
that error in the past fifteen years. Instead, the fact that the legislature has not made such 
i 
a change—even when it amended the Payment Bond Statute in 1989 and again in 1994— 
• 4 
undermines TSS' argument that the omission of any reference to rental equipment was 
simply a "mistake." 
C. The Miller Act Does Not Assist In Interpreting The Payment Bond 
Statute, As Utah's Interpretation Of Similar Provisions Has Differed 
From Interpretations Of The Federal Miller Act. 
TSS appeals to interpretations of the federal Miller Act, which, it argues, is the act 
on which Utah's Payment Bond Statute was based. See Appellee Br. at 8. Setting aside 
the fact that federal law is not controlling here, and that the federal Miller Act applies to 
public contracts, not private contracts as is the case here, interpretations of the federal 
Miller Act are still unavailing because (1) unlike case law relating to the federal Miller 
Act which has held that "equipment" is within the scope of "labor and material," Utah 
courts have recently reached the opposite conclusion when interpreting the same 
language; and (2) regardless of other courts' liberal interpretation of the federal Miller 
Act's provisions, Utah's own legislature has decided that to obtain coverage under the 
Payment Bond Statute, the items at issue must be specifically referenced. Therefore, 
interpretations of the Miller Act do not translate into appropriate interpretations for 
Utah's Payment Bond Statute. Each of these arguments is addressed in turn. 
2
 Finally, the federal Miller Act does not provide an appropriate analogy because relates 
to bonds of contractors of public buildings or works. As a result, the Utah counterpart is 
Utah Code Ann. §14-1-18 to -20 (Public Contracts), not the private contractor's 
payment bond statute at issue here, i. e., § 14-2-2. 
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I. Unlike Case Law Relating To The Federal Miller Act Holding 
That "Equipment" Is Within The Scope Of "Labor And 
Materials," The Utah Supreme Court Has Reached The 
Opposite Conclusion. 
TSS urges the Court to adopt a liberal interpretation of the Payment Bond Statute, 
using as an example a holding under the federal Miller Act "that equipment rental . . . is 
within the scope of 'material.'" Appellee Br. at 9. However, this interpretation of the 
federal Miller Act is directly contrary to two holdings by the Utah Supreme Court in 
which the Court considered nearly identical language.3 
With respect to the first case, Grace Fishing v. Ironwood Exploration, 766 P.2d 
1074, 1078-79 (Utah 1988), the Payment Bond Statute then in effect applied to "materials 
furnished or labor performed . . . ." but did not reference "equipment/' When faced with 
the issue of whether rental equipment was covered under the language "materials 
furnished or labor performed/5 the Court noted that unlike the mechanic's lien statute, 
rental charges were not included in the Payment Bond Statute until 1985, and observed 
"[w]hether the Legislature's creation of that divergence [between the inclusion of rental 
charges in the mechanics' lien statute, and the exclusion of rental charges in the pre-1985 
3
 Indeed, even TSS notes that like the federal Miller Act, "Johnson and Graco made no 
reference whatsoever to equipment." Appellee Br. at 12. However, unlike 
interpretations of the federal Miller Act, the Utah courts in Johnson and Graco "were 
unwilling to expand to equipment the protection afforded for labor and materials." Id. 
The federal Miller Act discusses protections for "labor and material" 40 U.S.C. § 270a. 
6 
Payment Bond Statute] was intentional or mere oversight is irrelevant. The fact remains 
that when this action arose, rental charges were not expressly subject to the contractor's 
bond statute and the liability it imposes." Id. at 1978-79 (emphasis added). Adhering to 
the principle that items covered under the Payment Bond Statute must be expressly 
included in the statute's language, the Court held that in the absence of a specific mention 
of rental equipment, the language (which is nearly identical to the federal Miller Act's 
language) did not cover such claims. Id. at 1079; see also, id. ("until the contractor's 
bond statute was broadened to expressly include rental charges, liability for rental charges 
could not be imposed under it.") (emphasis added). 
The same is true of the second case, Johnson v. Gallegos Constr. Co., 785 P.2d 
1109 (Utah 1990), in which the Utah Supreme Court considered whether rental 
equipment fell within the phrase "labor or material" under Utah's Procurement Code. In 
concluding that rentals were not covered, the Court reasoned (and TSS acknowledges) 
that rental equipment was not covered under the tenn "labor and material" because there 
was no reference to "equipment" in the statute. See id. at 1112; Appellee Br. at 11 
(acknowledging Court's holding in Johnson and noting that because of "the absence of 
any reference to 'equipment' under the payment bond provisions, the court concluded 
'the term 'labor and material' as used in Utah Code Ann. § 63-56-38 did not include rent 
for equipment.'"); see also id. at 10 (acknowledging that the bond provisions in Johnson 
1 
and Grace both "failed . . .-to specifically acknowledge claims for 'equipment' as part of 
'labor or materials."').4 
As demonstrated by the holdings in Johnson and Graco, the Utah Supreme Court 
has rendered two decisions at odds with interpretations of the federal Miller Act that TSS 
urges the Court to adopt. Adopting TSS' interpretation would require this Court to state 
that the Utah Supreme Court incorrectly decided Johnson and Grace 5 
2. Regardless Of The Liberal Interpretation Of The Miller Act's 
Provisions, Utah's Own Legislature Has Indicated That Covered 
Items Under This Specific Provision Of The Payment Bond \ 
Statute Must Be Specifically and Expressly Referenced. 
Adopting TSS' argument that the liberal interpretation of the federal Miller Act 
( 
4
 Saratoga cited Western Coating, Inc. v. Gibbons & Reed, 788 P.2d 503, 504 (Utah 1990) 
because it referenced the Court's ruling in Johnson and stated "the absence of language 
covering rental of equipment manifests] an intent by the legislature not to include such < 
rental." Appellant Br. at 10. Saratoga called the statutory amendment eliminating 
coverage "highly significant" in light of the quoted Western Coating language. 
Contrary to TSS' suggestion, Saratoga did not cite Western Coating to support its 
argument that the statute eliminated coverage for rentals. For this latter proposition, 
Saratoga cited the statutory amendments, and ample other support. < 
5
 TSS argues that "Utah Courts have in fact turned to the federal statute at times to 
interpret similar provisions in the Utah payment bond statutes." Appellee Br. at 8. In 
support of that statement, TSS cites a Utah decision, A.A. Maycock, Inc. v. General Ins. 
Co. of America, 24 Utah 2d 369, 371-72, 471 P.2d 424, 426 (1970), which does not ( 
interpret the provision at issue here, i.e., §14-2-2 (failure to obtain a bond), but rather 
interprets the notice provisions of an entirely different section of the chapter, i.e., §14-1-
6 (notice provisions for situations in which a bond has been posted). Because Maycock 
involves not only a different provision, but also a different statute, it is unavailing. 
Moreover, Maycock was decided in 1970, prior to the Utah Supreme Court's holdings in { 
Johnson and Graco. 
8 
4 
ought to apply here would not only require this Court to rule directly contrary to the Utah 
Supreme Court's decisions in Johnson and Graco, it would also require this Court to rule 
that the Utah Legislature has engaged in meaningless and unnecessary amendments, 
thereby undercutting the well-established principle of statutory construction that "[wjhere 
the legislature has amended a statute or omitted a portion of an act, it is presumed to have 
intended to modify the act." State v. Cotton, 790 P.2d 1050, 1053 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990) 
cert, denied, 790 P.2d 1032 (N.M. 1990) (emphasis added); see also Madsen v. Borthick, 
769 P.2d 245, 252 n.l 1 (Utah 1988) (noting in dicta "presumption that an amendment is 
intended to change existing legal rights"). 
As TSS acknowledges, the 1987 Payment Bond Statute "referred only to 'material 
furnished and labor supplied,'" but did not mention "equipment." Appellee Br. at 8; 
1987 Utah L. ch. 218 § 4. Using TSS' logic, under interpretations of the federal Miller 
Act, the term "material" in the 1987 statute should have been broad enough to encompass 
equipment. Apparently, however, the legislature did not agree, but rather saw fit in 1989 
to again amend the statute to specifically reference "equipment." See 1989 Utah L. ch 
271, Addendum E. TSS further argues that the 1987 legislature "mistakenly excluded" 
references to equipment. Appellee Br. at 8. TSS' position would mean that courts (such 
as Johnson and Graco) construing the 1987 Payment Bond Statute should have 
interpreted "material furnished and labor supplied" to include "rental equipment," 
thereby making the legislature's 1989 amendment adding the word "equipment" 
9 
unnecessary. Such a result is at odds with the legislature's decision to include a specific 
reference to "equipment" in a desire to specifically cover that item. If the legislature 
believed that interpretations of the federal Miller Act would have accomplished the same 
goal, it would not have found it necessary to amend the statute. TSS'position that 
"equipment rental . . . is within the scope of 'material' under the Miller Act" would 
i 
render the Utah Legislature's amendments to the Payment Bond Statute meaningless and 
would amount to telling the legislature that its changes were superfluous. See Appellee 
Br. at 9. ( 
D. Rental Equipment Must Be Treated Differently Than Purchased 
Equipment, And Thus Must Be Specifically Referenced In Legislation 
To Be Covered. 
i 
TSS would have the Court erase any distinction between equipment that is sold 
and equipment tliat is rented. See Appellee Br. at 6 (arguing "[sjection 14-2-2(1) makes 
no distinction between the two."). This argument ignores, however, the fact that such a 
distinction is important because rental equipment carries with it inherently different 
qualities and risks than equipment that is sold. For example, one court that declined to 
permit a materialman's lien on rental equipment explained the distinction by noting that 
"'machinery not (a) totally depreciated by use on the property or (b) incorporated into the 
I 
improvement, or (c) in connection with which labor was also supplied could not be the 




(R.L 1991) {quoting Air Service Co. v. Cosmo Investments, Inc., 155 S.E.2d413, 414 
(Ga. Ct.App. 1967)). 
This same reasoning applies to rental equipment in the payment bond context. As 
Saratoga has previously pointed out, a rental company bears a substantially lower risk 
than a company selling equipment for a project. In response, TSS argues that 
(1) Saratoga is precluded from raising the issue because it was not raised below; and 
(2) without the protection of the Payment Bond Statute, the rental company would lose 
the amount of rental charges to which it was entitled. Appellee Br. at 14. Each of these 
arguments is addressed in turn. 
First, this issue was raised below. During oral argument, TSS argued that rental 
equipment should be covered because it is supposedly "consumed" in the course of the 
project. Tr. at 9. By raising this issue, TSS opened the door for Saratoga to draw a 
distinction between rentals and other types of equipment. 
As to the second argument, TSS misses the Saratoga's point. Indeed, the risk 
analysis leaves little doubt that a renter is in a far better position to protect itself from 
6
 Moreover, so long as the issue is preserved, additional argument and analysis can be 
offered at the appellate level. Otherwise, parties would be limited to simply quoting 
verbatim from their briefs below. This is clearly not the rule. Indeed, TSS itself cites to 
cases that it did not refer to below. 
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such losses than is a seller—who needs the protection of the Payment Bond Statute. A 
renter could (a) require the customer to pre-pay; (b) require payment on an ongoing basis; 
(c) require a deposit; or, if necessary (d) repossess the rental equipment.6 Under scenario 
(d), the renter has lost little, other than the value of rental charges it could have otherwise 
collected. The rental equipment is already (presumably) used, and thus depreciation is 
not an issue for the rental company. Thereafter, the rental company can re-rent the 
equipment to other consumers at the same price that it would have rented before the 
renter defaulted. By contrast, a company that sells equipment either (a) loses the entire 
value of the equipment (for equipment incorporated into a project); or (b) if the 
equipment is repossessed, loses the amount of the equipment's depreciation and is 
thereafter precluded from re-selling its equipment at the same price that it otherwise 
TSS also states that "[ajnything incorporated into the project which could not be 
repossessed, such a [sic] the lumber mentioned in Saratoga's brief, is not equipment but 
materials, which are provided for in the statute." Appellee Br. at 15 (emphasis in 
original). It is unclear why TSS makes this statement, as it only reinforces Saratoga's 
argument that certain items, such as lumber consumed in a project, need the Payment 
Bond Statute's protection, and this is the reason that such items are specifically covered. 
This is not the case, however, with TSS' rental equipment, which was not consumed 
into the project and was thereafter recovered, obviating the need for the same type of 
protections as those required, for example, for suppliers of materials. 
8
 In this case, TSS voluntarily extended credit to Freewheeling after the initial funds 
Freewheeling had provided were consumed. As TSS notes, "Freewheeling continued to 
rent the equipment from T.S.S. on credit." Appellee Br. at 4. Obviously, once the 
initial funds were consumed, TSS was presented with yet another of many opportunities 
to protect itself and prevent any loss. 
12 
would have sold it because of the loss of value.9 Because a renter bears a substantially 
lower risk than a seller, a renter does not require the same type of protection afforded to 
sellers under the Payment Bond Statute. 
II. Saratoga Received No Value From TSS' Rental Of Equipment. 
In its opening memorandum, Saratoga pointed out that there was no resulting 
benefit—and therefore no resulting value—to Saratoga because Freewheeling "wholly 
failed to meet the requirements and agreed specifications and the work and efforts of the 
Co-Defendant had to be removed and re-constructed through another party." See R. 346; 
Appellant Br. at 16-17. Therefore, TSS' equipment did not result in any "improvement" 
or "value" to Saratoga. This argument is supported by case law, see, e.g. John Wagner 
Assocs. v. Hercules, Inc., 797 P.2d 1123, 1130 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (stating the Payment 
Bond Statute's purpose "is that the risk of loss [is] borne by 'the owner of the premises at 
whose instance and for whose benefit the improvement [was] made.") (emphasis added), 
cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991) {quoting Rio Grande Lumber Co. v. Darke, 50 
Utah 114, 167 P. 241, 244 (1917)), and statutory language. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann. 
§ 14-2-2 (stating claimant is entitled only to "the reasonable value o/the labor or service 
9
 Interestingly, in a case that TSS cites for a different proposition, Oscar E. Chytraus Co. 
v. Wasatch Furnace & Elec.,Inc, 28 Utah 2d 339, 502 P.2d 554 (1972), recovery was 
permitted under the Payment Bond Statute for equipment there was actually consumed 
in the project, not which was rented in the project, as is the case here. 
13 
performed or the equipment or materials furnished up to but not exceeding the contract 
price") (emphasis added).i0 
In response, TSS argues that such an interpretation "is contrary to the common 
sense meaning of the statute, which contemplates the supplier of the equipment is to be 
compensated for the .value, of it to the supplier/' arguing that the owner is "in the best 
position to ensure compliance," and "is certainly in a better position than the remote 
equipment supplier." Appellee Br. at 16-17. In fact, the reverse is tme. The party in the 
best position to protect itself is the party who is renting the equipment, i.e., TSS. As 
outlined above, there are numerous steps that TSS could have taken to protect itself that 
Saratoga could not possibly have undertaken. By contrast, Saratoga never dealt directly 
with TSS. 
TSS also asserts—without any supporting case law—that the "reasonable value" 
refers to the item's value to the supplier rather than its value to the owner. In fact, the 
statute does not specify whose measure of value should be used. It does, however, refer 
to recovery "up to but not exceeding the contract price." Utah Code Ann. §14-2-2(1) 
(emphasis added). The reference to "contract price" seems to suggest value inuring to the 
In response to Saratoga's argument that TSS is further not entitled to recover as a sub-
subcontractor, TSS argues that the only question is how far the protection should 
extend. In so arguing, TSS highlights exactly the problem with covering a sub-
subcontractor under the Payment Bond Statute's rubric. TSS did not furnish any 
equipment under the contract between Saratoga and the contractor, nor under the 
contract between the contractor and Freewheeling. 
14 
owner, not the renter, as an item's value to the renter would have to be something less 
than the contract price to ensure a profit on the rental. 
III. This Is Not An Appropriate Situation For The Award Of Attorneys' Fees 
Because Saratoga Has Prosecuted This Action In Good Faith And Because 
TSS Engaged In Inequitable Conduct Prior To Making A Claim Against 
Saratoga. 
TSS argues, without any statutory support, that the discretionary attorneys' fees 
provision provides a so-called "inherent presumption" that attorneys' fees should 
"generally" be awarded in claims such as TSS'. Appellee Br. at 21. TSS goes on to state 
that "[h]ad Saratoga furnished a payment bond,. . . T.S.S. would have had rights against 
the bond, under § 14-2-1 [and] [h]ad T.S.S. prevailed on that claim . . . it would have 
been entitled to attorneys' fees by statute." Id. (emphasis in original). In so arguing, TSS 
underscores Saratoga's point, namely, that in an action under § 14-2-1, attorneys' fees are 
mandatory, but in an action under § 14-2-2, which is the section under which TSS 
brought this claim, attorneys' fees are only discretionary. This gives rise to the 
presumption that there are circumstances under § 14-2-2 where an award of attorneys' 
fees is not appropriate. This is precisely such a case. However, instead of arguing facts 
that purportedly bring TSS within the purview of the discretionary fees, TSS instead 
argues that "[o]nly in extraordinary circumstances" should attorneys' fees be denied 
under § 14-2-2. Appellee Br. at 21. TSS goes on to cite three such circumstances. Id. 
The problem with this argument, of course, is not only that the statute does not support 
this interpretation, but, more importantly, that there also is no case law to support it. 
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There is an additional fact in this case that warrants the denial of attorneys5 fees, 
which TSS failed to address in its brief. As Saratoga previously discussed, TSS' conduct 
in this case in first filing a wrongful mechanics' lien makes the case for attorneys' fees 
even more inappropriate. TSS placed a blanket notice of mechanics' lien on multiple lots 
and properties including numerous such lots that Saratoga did not own, forcing Saratoga 
to engage legal counsel to obtain a release of the lien claims both for properties it owned 
and also on behalf of other property owners within residential subdivisions developed by 
Saratoga to protect and preserve its goodwill among prospective property owners affected < 
by the wrongful liens. It was only after Saratoga pointed out the flaw in TSS' legal 
reasoning on its mechanics' lien claim that TSS withdrew its mechanics' lien notice. 
IV. TSS Is Not Entitled To The 18% Contractual Interest Rate Because Saratoga 
Did Not Contract For That Rate. 
In response to Saratoga's argument that TSS is not entitled to the 18% contractual 
interest rate, TSS cites Oscar E. Chytrans Co. v. Wasatch Furnace & Elec, Inc., 28 Utah 
2d 339, 502 P.2d 554 (1972). TSS does not address the more recent case Saratoga cited, 
Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail Inc., 652 P.2d 1298 (Utah 1982), nor does it address j 
the policy reasons Saratoga set forth regarding why it is not appropriate to award interest 
at a contractual rate to which Saratoga did not agree. Following TSS' logic, a sub-
subcontractor could truly gain a windfall by collecting from an owner an exorbitant 
interest rate in a contract to which the owner was not a party. For these reasons, Saratoga 
respectfully submits that statutory interest, rather than contractual interest, is appropriate. 
16 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision. 
DATED this ( 5 ""day of May, 2002. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Douglas Matsumori 
Brent W. Wride 
Elaina M. Maragakis 
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